

Conflict and Intervention (Prescribed Subject 5)

IB SL Study Guide

Contents

How to Use This Guide	3.1 Background: Kosovo Within Yugoslavia
Section 1: Paper 1 Exam Strategy	3.2 Causes of the Conflict
1.1 Paper 1 Format	3.3 Escalation (1998–1999)
1.2 OPVL Analysis Framework	3.4 NATO Intervention: Operation Allied Force (March–June 1999)
1.3 Time Management	3.5 Aftermath
Section 2: Case Study 1 — Rwanda (1990–1998)	Section 4: Comparative Analysis
2.1 Background: Colonial Legacy and Ethnic Division	4.1 Common Themes
2.2 Causes of the Genocide	4.2 Key Differences
2.3 The Genocide (April–July 1994)	4.3 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
2.4 International Response	Section 5: Source Analysis Practice
2.5 Aftermath and Justice	Practice Question Set 1: Rwanda
Section 3: Case Study 2 — Kosovo (1989–1999)	Practice Question Set 2: Kosovo
	Section 6: Key Terms and Definitions

How to Use This Guide

- **Paper 1 Prescribed Subject 5** examines conflict, intervention, and the international community's response to crises in the late 20th century
- **Paper 1** is a **source-based exam** — 1 hour, worth **20% of your final grade**. You will be given **4–5 written and visual sources** on one of the two case studies and must answer **4 structured questions**
- This is **not an essay paper**. Every answer must be **rooted in the sources** provided. Outside knowledge supports source analysis — it does not replace it
- The IB requires you to study **two case studies from different regions**. This guide covers **Rwanda (Africa)** and **Kosovo (Europe)**
- **Exam Alerts** flag common mistakes that cost marks on Paper 1
- **IB Tips** highlight what examiners reward in source-based answers
- **Worked Examples** provide model source analysis with annotations

A *igned to IB History SL/HL Prescribed Subject 5 — current syllabus*

Section 1: Paper 1 Exam Strategy

1.1 Paper 1 Format

Paper 1 gives you a set of sources (typically 4) and asks 4 questions of escalating difficulty:

Question	Task	Marks	Time (approx.)
Q1	Comprehension — What does Source A suggest/state about...?	3	5 minutes
Q2	Comparison — Compare and contrast Sources B and C regarding... Evaluation — With reference to origin, purpose, and content, assess the value and limitations of Source D for...	4	10 minutes
Q3	Synthesis — Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate...	6	15 minutes
Q4	Synthesis — Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate...	9 + 2 for structure	25 minutes

Total: 24 marks in 60 minutes. Budget 5 minutes for reading all sources before you write.

EXAM ALERT

Exam Alert: Q4 requires **both** source references **and** own knowledge. Students who rely only on own knowledge (treating Q4 like an essay) or only on sources (ignoring outside context) cannot score above band 3. You must integrate both.

1.2 OPVL Analysis Framework

OPVL (Origin, Purpose, Value, Limitation) is the core analytical tool for Paper 1. Use it explicitly in Q3 and implicitly throughout.

Element	What to identify	Example phrase
Origin	Who created it? When?	"This is an extract from a UN Security Council resolution dated April 1994..."
	Where? What type of source?	
Purpose	Why was it created?	"Its purpose was to justify the reduction of UNAMIR forces to member states..."
	Who was the audience?	
Value	What makes this source useful for a historian studying this topic?	"It is valuable because it reveals the institutional reasoning behind inaction at the moment of crisis..."
	What does the source NOT tell us? What bias or gap exists?	
Limitation		"However, as an official document it omits dissenting voices within the Council and does not reflect the information available to individual delegations..."

IB TIP

IB Tip: Never reduce OPVL to a checklist. Examiners reward answers that show how origin and purpose **affect the value and limitations** of a source for a specific research question. The connection between the elements is what earns marks.

1.3 Time Management

Phase	Time	Action
Reading	5 min	Read all sources. Annotate key claims, provenance, and tone
Q1	5 min	Short, precise. Quote or paraphrase from the source
Q2	10 min	Structure: similarity → difference → similarity/difference. Always cite both sources
Q3	15 min	OPVL with explicit links between elements. Reference content of the source
Q4	25 min	Mini-essay: introduction, 2–3 paragraphs integrating sources + own knowledge, brief conclusion

Section 2: Case Study 1 — Rwanda (1990–1998)

2.1 Background: Colonial Legacy and Ethnic Division

Rwanda's ethnic categories were not ancient tribal divisions — they were **hardened by colonial administration** into rigid, politically charged identities.

Pre-colonial Rwanda: The terms Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa existed but referred primarily to socioeconomic status. Cattle-owning elites were Tutsi; agricultural majority were Hutu. Movement between categories was possible through marriage, wealth, or royal appointment.

German colonial rule (1884–1919): Germany administered Rwanda through existing Tutsi monarchy structures, reinforcing the political dominance of the Tutsi elite.

Belgian administration (1919–1962): Belgium dramatically sharpened ethnic divisions:

- Introduced **identity cards** (1933) classifying every Rwandan as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa based on physical measurements and cattle ownership
- Gave Tutsi exclusive access to education, administrative positions, and Catholic Church leadership
- Created a racial hierarchy justified by the “**Hamitic hypothesis**” — the pseudo-scientific claim that Tutsi were a superior “Nilotic” race who had migrated to Rwanda and were naturally suited to rule

The 1959 Hutu Revolution and independence (1962): As decolonization approached, Belgium switched its support to the Hutu majority. The 1959 “Social Revolution” overthrew the Tutsi monarchy. Waves of anti-Tutsi violence drove **tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile** in Uganda, Burundi, and Congo. The Republic of Rwanda, led by Hutu presidents, was established in 1962.

EXAM ALERT

Exam Alert: Source questions often test whether you understand that Hutu/Tutsi divisions were **politicized and hardened by colonialism**, not primordial tribal hatreds. Answers that describe the genocide as “ancient tribal conflict” will lose marks for historical inaccuracy.

2.2 Causes of the Genocide

The Habyarimana Regime (1973–1994)

President Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in a 1973 coup and established a single-party state under the **MRND** (Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement). His regime:

- Maintained **ethnic quotas** limiting Tutsi access to education and government jobs (officially 9%, reflecting their estimated population share)
- Built a patronage network concentrated among Hutu from his home region in the northwest (*akazu* — “little house”)
- Kept relative stability through the 1980s but faced growing economic pressure from falling coffee prices and structural adjustment programs

The RPF Invasion (1990)

The **Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)**, composed largely of Tutsi exiles who had grown up in Uganda, invaded northern Rwanda on **1 October 1990**. Led by Fred Rwigyema (killed on day two) and then **Paul Kagame**, the RPF fought a guerrilla war from the Virunga mountains.

The invasion had three critical effects:

1. **Hardened Hutu extremism** — regime hardliners portrayed all Tutsi (including those inside Rwanda) as RPF collaborators (*ibyitso*)
2. **Justified militarization** — the Rwandan army expanded from 5,000 to 30,000+ troops; civilian militias were armed
3. **International pressure for negotiations** — France, Belgium, and the OAU pushed both sides toward talks

The Arusha Accords (1993)

Under international pressure, Habyarimana signed the **Arusha Peace Accords** (August 1993), which mandated:

- Power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi political parties
- Integration of RPF fighters into the national army
- Deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (**UNAMIR**) to monitor the transition

Hutu extremists within the regime — the *Hutu Power* faction — viewed Arusha as a **betrayal**. They had no intention of implementing the accords and began planning an alternative solution.

Hate Media and Propaganda

Two media outlets played a central role in preparing the population for violence:

- **Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTL)**: Launched in 1993, RTL broadcast a mixture of popular music and virulently anti-Tutsi propaganda. It referred to Tutsi as *inyenzi* (“cockroaches”) and *inzoka* (“snakes”), dehumanizing the target population. During the genocide, RTL broadcast names, locations, and instructions for killers.
- **Kangura newspaper**: Published the infamous “**Hutu Ten Commandments**” (1990), which prohibited Hutu from marrying, employing, or befriending Tutsi and declared any Hutu who did so a traitor.

IB TIP

IB Tip: Media propaganda is a frequent source topic. When analyzing a source from RTL or Kangura, always connect the **dehumanizing language** to its **purpose** (preparing ordinary citizens to participate in mass killing) and its **limitation** (it reflects the extremist position, not the views of all Hutu).

2.3 The Genocide (April–July 1994)

6 April 1994: President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over Kigali airport. The perpetrators remain disputed (Hutu extremists and RPF have both been accused). Within hours, roadblocks appeared across Kigali and the killing began.

Key events and phases:

Date	Event
6 April 1994	Habyarimana's plane shot down; killings begin in Kigali
7 April	Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian UN peacekeepers murdered
8–12 April	Killings spread systematically from Kigali to rural prefectures
9–11 April	Belgian paratroopers evacuate foreign nationals only; Belgium withdraws from UNAMIR
21 April	UN Security Council votes to reduce UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270 troops
Late April–May	Massacres at churches, schools, and stadiums where Tutsi had sought refuge (Nyarubuye, Murambi, Bisesero)
17 May	UN reverses course, authorizes UNAMIR II (5,500 troops) — deployment takes months
22 June	France launches Operation Turquoise (UN-authorized, French-led)
4 July	RPF captures Kigali
18 July	RPF declares military victory; genocide ends

Scale: In approximately **100 days**, an estimated **800,000–1,000,000** Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed — roughly **75% of the Tutsi population** of Rwanda. The killing rate exceeded that of the Holocaust and the atomic bombings.

The Interahamwe and civilian participation: The genocide was not carried out solely by the military. The **Interahamwe** (“those who attack together”), the MRND youth militia, organized and led the killings at the local level. Ordinary Hutu citizens participated — sometimes under coercion, sometimes willingly. This mass participation is one of the most studied and debated aspects of the genocide.

EXAM ALERT

Exam Alert: Do not describe the genocide as “chaos” or “spontaneous tribal violence.” The evidence shows it was **planned, organized, and directed** by the Hutu Power faction within the government. Roadblock lists, weapons caches (machetes imported from China), and RTLM broadcasts all indicate pre-planning. Examiners will penalize answers that miss this.

2.4 International Response

The international community's failure to prevent or stop the genocide is a central theme of Prescribed Subject 5.

UNAMIR and General Dallaire

Canadian General **Roméo Dallaire** commanded UNAMIR. In January 1994, Dallaire sent the now-famous “**genocide fax**” to UN headquarters, warning of weapons caches and plans for systematic killing. He requested permission to raid the caches. UN headquarters (under Kofi Annan's Department of Peacekeeping Operations) **denied the**

request, instructing Dallaire to share the intelligence with President Habyarimana — one of the people implicated.

During the genocide, Dallaire's reduced force of 270 troops saved an estimated **30,000 lives** by sheltering Tutsi at UN compounds, but he was powerless to stop the broader killing.

The United Nations

- **21 April:** Security Council voted to **reduce** UNAMIR — the opposite of what the crisis demanded
- **17 May:** Council authorized UNAMIR II with 5,500 troops, but member states were unwilling to contribute forces. Deployment was delayed for months
- **Terminology:** The UN and member states deliberately avoided using the word “**genocide**” for weeks, as formal recognition would have triggered legal obligations to act under the 1948 Genocide Convention

The United States

- The Clinton administration was scarred by the **1993 Somalia disaster** (Battle of Mogadishu / “Black Hawk Down”) and unwilling to commit troops to another African intervention
- State Department spokesperson Christine Shelley was instructed to say “**acts of genocide**” rather than “genocide” to avoid legal obligation
- Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), issued just weeks before the genocide, tightened criteria for US participation in UN peacekeeping operations

France — Operation Turquoise

France launched Operation Turquoise on 22 June 1994 with UN Security Council authorization. It established a “**safe humanitarian zone**” in southwestern Rwanda. However, France's role remains deeply controversial:

- France had been a close ally of the Habyarimana regime, providing military training and weapons
- The safe zone allowed **Hutu génocidaires to flee into Congo/Zaire** alongside genuine refugees
- Critics argue France intervened to protect its allies, not to stop the genocide

IB TIP

IB Tip: When a source question asks about the international response, avoid blanket statements like “the world did nothing.” Be specific: the UN reduced troops when it should have reinforced; the US blocked the use of the word “genocide”; France intervened late and with conflicting motives. Precision earns marks.

2.5 Aftermath and Justice

RPF Victory and refugee crisis: The RPF's military victory in July 1994 ended the genocide but triggered a massive refugee exodus. Over **2 million Hutu** (including both civilians and génocidaires) fled to camps in eastern Zaire (now DRC), where armed groups reorganized. These camps became a destabilizing factor in the region, contributing to the First and Second Congo Wars.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR):

- Established by the UN Security Council in November 1994, based in Arusha, Tanzania
- Prosecuted senior leaders: Prime Minister Jean Kambanda **pleaded guilty** to genocide (first head of government convicted of genocide)
- Delivered landmark rulings including the recognition of **rape as an instrument of genocide** (*Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, 1998)
- Completed its mandate in 2015 after indicting 93 individuals

Gacaca courts:

- Community-based courts established in 2001 to handle the overwhelming number of lower-level genocide suspects (over 120,000 in Rwandan prisons)
- Combined elements of traditional Rwandan conflict resolution with formal legal proceedings
- Processed approximately **1.9 million cases** by their closure in 2012
- Praised for enabling mass participation in justice; criticized for procedural weaknesses and potential for false accusations

EXAM ALERT

Exam Alert: If asked to evaluate the effectiveness of justice mechanisms, contrast the ICTR (international, slow, expensive, focused on leaders) with gacaca (local, fast, community-driven, focused on reconciliation). Do not simply list facts — make a **judgment** about their relative effectiveness.

Section 3: Case Study 2 — Kosovo (1989–1999)

3.1 Background: Kosovo Within Yugoslavia

Kosovo is a small territory in the southern Balkans with a **majority ethnic Albanian population** (approximately 90% Albanian, 10% Serb by the 1990s) but enormous **symbolic significance for Serbian nationalism**.

Historical significance: Serbs regard Kosovo as the cradle of their national identity. The **Battle of Kosovo (1389)** — in which the medieval Serbian kingdom was defeated by the Ottoman Empire — became a central myth of Serbian nationalism, reinforced by the presence of important Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches.

Tito-era Yugoslavia (1945–1980): Under Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia was organized as a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces. Kosovo was an **autonomous province within Serbia**, with its own government, courts, and police force. While Kosovo Albanians remained economically disadvantaged (Kosovo was the poorest region of Yugoslavia), they had significant control over local institutions, including Albanian-language education through university level.

Post-Tito instability: After Tito's death in 1980, rising nationalism across Yugoslavia challenged the federal structure. Kosovo Albanian protests in 1981 demanded republic status for Kosovo, provoking a Serbian backlash.

3.2 Causes of the Conflict

Milosevic and the Revocation of Autonomy (1989)

Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia by exploiting the Kosovo issue. In a famous speech at **Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1989** (the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo), he told a crowd of hundreds of thousands: “No one should dare to beat you” — a message widely interpreted as a promise to restore Serbian dominance.

In 1989–1990, Milosevic **revoked Kosovo's autonomy**:

- Dissolved the Kosovo Assembly and government
- Dismissed Albanian workers from public sector jobs (estimated 80,000–100,000 people)
- Closed Albanian-language schools and university faculties
- Imposed Serbian as the sole official language
- Replaced Albanian police and judges with Serbs

The result was the **effective apartheid** of Kosovo Albanians within their own territory.

Albanian Resistance: Two Paths

Ibrahim Rugova and nonviolent resistance (1990–1997):

- Rugova, leader of the **Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)**, pursued a strategy of **peaceful, parallel institutions**
- Kosovo Albanians organized an underground education system (classes in private homes), parallel health services, and a shadow government
- Rugova sought international recognition and intervention through diplomacy
- The strategy maintained Albanian cohesion but produced no political results — the international community largely ignored Kosovo during the Bosnian War

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (1996–1999):

- As nonviolence failed to produce change, a younger generation turned to armed resistance

- The **KLA** (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës / UÇK) emerged publicly in 1996–1997, attacking Serbian police and officials
- The KLA was a diverse movement: nationalists, former political prisoners, and diaspora volunteers. Its leadership included **Hashim Thaçi** (later Kosovo’s president, subsequently indicted for war crimes)
- The US initially described the KLA as a “terrorist organization” (February 1998) but later shifted to regarding it as a legitimate resistance movement

IB TIP

IB Tip: The shift from Rugova’s nonviolence to KLA armed resistance is a valuable point of analysis. Sources may present these as competing strategies. Consider what each approach achieved and why the international community responded differently to violent vs. nonviolent resistance.

3.3 Escalation (1998–1999)

The Drenica Offensive (February–March 1998)

Serbian security forces launched a major operation against the KLA in the **Drenica region** of central Kosovo. On **5–7 March 1998**, Serbian police killed **58 members of the Jashari family** compound, including women and children. The Drenica massacre became a rallying point for Albanian resistance and drew international attention.

International Response Begins

- **UN Security Council Resolution 1199** (September 1998): Demanded a ceasefire, withdrawal of Serbian security forces, and access for humanitarian organizations
- **US envoy Richard Holbrooke** negotiated a ceasefire in October 1998, including the deployment of **OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) monitors** — the Kosovo Verification Mission
- The ceasefire held only temporarily; both sides violated it

The Racak Massacre (January 1999)

On **15 January 1999**, Serbian forces killed **45 Kosovo Albanian civilians** in the village of Racak. The head of the OSCE verification mission, **William Walker**, publicly declared it a “massacre” and a “crime against humanity.”

Serbia denied it was a massacre, claiming the dead were KLA fighters. A Finnish forensic team found that most victims were unarmed civilians, though the findings remained contested.

Racak proved to be a **turning point**: it shifted international opinion decisively toward intervention and prompted the Rambouillet negotiations.

Rambouillet Negotiations (February–March 1999)

The **Contact Group** (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia) convened peace talks at Rambouillet, France:

- The proposed agreement required Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo, restoration of autonomy, and deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force
- The Kosovo Albanian delegation (led by Thaçi) **accepted** the terms
- Serbia **rejected** them, particularly the provision for NATO troops on Serbian soil, which Milosevic called an unacceptable violation of sovereignty
- Russia supported Serbia's objections and made clear it would **veto** any UN Security Council resolution authorizing force

EXAM ALERT

Exam Alert: The Rambouillet negotiations are frequently tested. Be prepared to analyze them from multiple perspectives: was the agreement a genuine peace offer or an ultimatum designed to justify intervention? Sources may support either interpretation. Your job is to evaluate the evidence, not pick a side.

3.4 NATO Intervention: Operation Allied Force (March–June 1999)

On **24 March 1999**, NATO began **Operation Allied Force** — a 78-day air campaign against Yugoslav military and strategic targets. This was the first time NATO had used military force against a sovereign state.

Key features of the intervention:

- **No UN Security Council authorization** — Russia and China had threatened vetoes. NATO argued it acted on the basis of humanitarian necessity
- **Air power only** — NATO chose not to deploy ground troops, partly due to political reluctance to accept casualties and partly due to memories of the Bosnian ground intervention
- Targets included military installations, bridges, power stations, and government buildings in both Kosovo and Serbia proper (including Belgrade)
- **Civilian casualties:** NATO strikes accidentally hit a refugee convoy (14 April), the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (7 May), and other civilian targets, killing an estimated 500+ Yugoslav civilians

Serbian response during the bombing:

- Rather than deterring Serbian aggression, the bombing initially **accelerated ethnic cleansing** in Kosovo
- Serbian forces expelled approximately **850,000 Kosovo Albanians** into neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro
- Widespread destruction of Albanian homes, documents, and property — a systematic campaign to alter Kosovo's demographics

Resolution:

- Milosevic agreed to withdraw on **3 June 1999** after 78 days of bombing, Russian diplomatic pressure (the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission), and growing evidence that a ground invasion was being planned
- **UN Security Council Resolution 1244** (10 June 1999) authorized the deployment of **KFOR** (NATO-led Kosovo Force) and established **UNMIK** (UN Mission in Kosovo) to administer the territory
- Serbian forces withdrew; KLA was required to disarm

3.5 Aftermath

UNMIK Administration (1999–2008):

- Kosovo was placed under UN administration while its final status remained unresolved
- Resolution 1244 technically preserved Yugoslav/Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo while granting it self-governance — a deliberate ambiguity
- Challenges included reverse ethnic cleansing (attacks on remaining Serb population), organized crime, and economic underdevelopment

Kosovo Independence (2008):

- On **17 February 2008**, Kosovo declared independence, recognized immediately by the US, UK, France, and Germany
- Serbia, Russia, China, Spain, and several other states **refused recognition**
- As of 2025, Kosovo is recognized by over 100 UN member states but is not a UN member

ICJ Advisory Opinion (2010):

- Serbia requested an advisory opinion from the **International Court of Justice** on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence
- The ICJ ruled (10–4) that the declaration **did not violate international law** — but carefully noted it was not ruling on whether Kosovo had a *right* to independence or on the broader question of secession
- The opinion was narrowly framed and satisfied neither side fully

IB TIP

IB Tip: The legal and ethical debate over Kosovo's independence connects directly to the question of intervention: if NATO's intervention was justified by humanitarian necessity, does the resulting state have a right to self-determination? This is exactly the kind of nuanced argument that earns marks in Q4.

Section 4: Comparative Analysis

4.1 Common Themes

Both case studies illustrate recurring patterns in conflict and international intervention:

Theme	Rwanda	Kosovo
Ethnic dimension	Hutu/Tutsi divisions hardened by colonialism	Albanian/Serb divisions exploited by nationalism
State-directed violence	Government organized genocide through military, militia, and media	Serbian state carried out ethnic cleansing through security forces
Warning signs ignored	Dallaire's "genocide fax" dismissed; Arusha process undermined	Years of repression under Milosevic; Drenica massacre
International hesitation	UN reduced UNAMIR; US avoided the word "genocide"	Diplomatic efforts dragged through 1998; Rambouillet as last resort
Media role	RTLM and Kangura incited genocide	International media coverage of Racak shifted public opinion toward intervention

4.2 Key Differences

Factor	Rwanda	Kosovo
Timing of intervention	No meaningful military intervention until it was too late (Operation Turquoise: 22 June, after ~80 days of genocide)	NATO intervened before the worst-case scenario (full genocide) materialized
Mechanism	UN peacekeeping (weak mandate, insufficient troops)	NATO military alliance (air campaign without UN authorization)
Authorization	UNAMIR authorized by Security Council but under-resourced	NATO acted without Security Council authorization
Outcome	Genocide completed; ended by RPF military victory, not international action	Ethnic cleansing reversed; outcome shaped by NATO bombing + diplomacy
Justice	ICTR + gacaca courts	ICTY (existing tribunal) + Kosovo Specialist Chambers (The Hague)

4.3 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The failures in Rwanda and the controversies of Kosovo were **directly responsible** for the development of the **Responsibility to Protect** doctrine:

- **2001:** The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the Canadian government in response to Kofi Annan’s challenge (“if humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda?”), published the R2P report
- **2005:** The UN World Summit adopted R2P as a principle — member states agreed that sovereignty carries the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and that the international community has a responsibility to act when a state fails to protect its people
- **Key tension:** R2P attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with human rights — the same tension visible in both case studies

EXAM ALERT

Exam Alert: R2P is not a law — it is a **political commitment**. Do not describe it as binding international law. If a source references R2P, evaluate whether it represents aspiration or enforceable obligation. This distinction matters in Q3 and Q4 responses.

Section 5: Source Analysis Practice

Practice Question Set 1: Rwanda

Source A: Extract from General Roméo Dallaire’s memoir, *Shake Hands with the Devil* (2003):

“I told the [UN] headquarters that we had identified arms caches and that an informant inside the Interahamwe had given us details of plans for mass extermination. I asked for permission to raid the weapons. The response came back: do not raid; share the intelligence with President Habyarimana. I was incredulous. We were being told to inform the fox that we knew what was happening in the henhouse.”

Source B: UN Security Council Resolution 912 (21 April 1994):

“The Security Council... decides to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR... the revised UNAMIR will... act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor and report on developments in Rwanda.”

Q1 (3 marks): What does Source A suggest about the UN’s response to early warnings of the genocide?

 WORKED EXAMPLE

Model Answer: Source A suggests that the UN headquarters dismissed credible intelligence about the planned genocide and actively prevented UNAMIR from taking preventive action. Dallaire states he identified specific threats — “arms caches” and plans for “mass extermination” from an informant — but was ordered not to intervene. The source further suggests the UN’s instruction to share intelligence with Habyarimana was counterproductive, as Dallaire’s metaphor (“inform the fox”) implies the UN was directing him to alert someone complicit in the planning. The overall suggestion is that bureaucratic caution at UN headquarters overrode field-level urgency.

Q3 (6 marks): With reference to its origin, purpose, and content, assess the value and limitations of Source A for a historian studying the international community’s failure to prevent the genocide.

 WORKED EXAMPLE

Model Answer: Source A is an extract from General Dallaire’s memoir *Shake Hands with the Devil*, published in 2003 — nine years after the genocide. Dallaire was the UNAMIR commander on the ground, giving him **direct, first-hand knowledge** of communications with UN headquarters and the operational constraints his force faced.

The source is **valuable** because it provides a detailed insider account of the specific moment when early intervention was possible but blocked. Dallaire’s account of the “genocide fax” episode is corroborated by the declassified cable itself (released in 1998), lending credibility to his version of events. His description of the UN’s instruction to share intelligence with Habyarimana reveals the institutional dysfunction that prevented action — information a historian could not obtain from official UN records alone.

However, the source has **limitations**. As a memoir published years later, it is shaped by Dallaire’s purpose: to explain the failure and assign responsibility. Dallaire has a personal stake in demonstrating that he warned headquarters and was overruled — this framing positions him as the clear-sighted officer constrained by bureaucratic inaction. While largely corroborated, the memoir may simplify complex decision-making within the UN Secretariat. Additionally, as a single perspective, it does not reveal the reasoning or constraints faced by officials in New York who received his warnings.

Practice Question Set 2: Kosovo

Source C: Extract from a speech by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, 22 April 1999 (during the NATO bombing campaign):

“This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We have learned the lesson of the Holocaust. We

have learned too from Rwanda... No one in the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that NATO's military action is justified."

Source D: Statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 24 March 1999:

"Russia is deeply upset by NATO's military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, which is nothing other than open aggression. The strikes must be halted immediately. It is the right of the UN Security Council alone to decide questions of peace and war."

Q2 (4 marks): Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and D regarding NATO's intervention in Kosovo.

 **WORKED EXAMPLE**

Model Answer: Both Sources C and D address the legitimacy of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo, but they reach **opposite conclusions**.

Blair (Source C) frames the intervention as morally justified — a “just war” motivated by “values” rather than territorial ambition. He connects Kosovo to historical precedents of genocide (the Holocaust, Rwanda), implying that failure to act would repeat past moral failures. His argument rests on **humanitarian grounds**: ethnic cleansing creates an obligation to intervene.

Yeltsin (Source D) characterizes the same intervention as “open aggression” against a “sovereign” state. His argument rests on **legal and procedural grounds**: only the UN Security Council has the authority to authorize the use of force, and NATO acted without that authorization.

The key **contrast** is therefore between humanitarian justification (Blair) and legal sovereignty (Yeltsin). However, there is an implicit **similarity**: both leaders invoke international norms — Blair appeals to the norm against genocide, Yeltsin to the norm of state sovereignty and the authority of the UN Charter. The fundamental disagreement is over which norm takes precedence when they conflict.

Section 6: Key Terms and Definitions

Term	Definition
Arusha Accords	1993 peace agreement between the Rwandan government and RPF, mandating power-sharing and a UN peacekeeping force
Ethnic cleansing	The systematic forced removal of an ethnic or religious group from a territory through violence, intimidation, or deportation
Gacaca courts	Community-based justice system in Rwanda (2001–2012) for trying lower-level genocide suspects
Genocide	Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (1948 Genocide Convention)
Genocide Convention (1948)	UN treaty requiring signatory states to prevent and punish genocide — the legal obligation Rwanda’s case exposed as unenforceable in practice
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda — UN tribunal (1994–2015) that prosecuted senior genocide planners
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia — UN tribunal that prosecuted war crimes in the Balkan conflicts
Interahamwe	”Those who attack together” — MRND youth militia that organized and carried out mass killings during the Rwandan genocide
KFOR	NATO-led Kosovo Force deployed after June 1999 to maintain security
KLA (UÇK)	Kosovo Liberation Army — Albanian guerrilla/insurgent movement that fought for Kosovo’s independence from Serbia
OPVL	Origin, Purpose, Value, Limitation — the standard IB framework for analyzing historical sources
Operation Allied Force	NATO’s 78-day air campaign against Yugoslavia (March–June 1999)
Operation Turquoise	French-led military intervention in Rwanda (June–August 1994), authorized by the UN, that established a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda
R2P (Responsibility to Protect)	Doctrine adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit stating that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities, and that the international community may act when a state fails to do so
Rambouillet	February–March 1999 peace conference where Serbia rejected terms requiring NATO troop deployment in Kosovo
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front — Tutsi-led rebel force that invaded Rwanda in 1990 and ended the genocide in July 1994
RTLM	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines — Rwandan radio station that broadcast anti-Tutsi propaganda and directed killers during the genocide

Term	Definition
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda — the peacekeeping force whose mandate was fatally reduced during the genocide
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo — administered Kosovo from 1999 until Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008
UN Security Council Resolution 1244	1999 resolution ending the Kosovo conflict, authorizing KFOR and UNMIK while preserving Serbian sovereignty in principle

Final exam preparation checklist:

- Can you explain the **causes** of both the Rwandan genocide and the Kosovo conflict in specific, evidence-based terms?
- Can you analyze the **international response** to each case, identifying what was done, what was not done, and why?
- Can you perform **OPVL analysis** on a source in under 15 minutes, connecting origin and purpose to value and limitations?
- Can you write a **Q4 mini-essay** that integrates source references with your own knowledge in a structured argument?
- Can you compare and contrast the two case studies using specific evidence, not vague generalizations?
- Do you understand how Rwanda and Kosovo contributed to the development of **R2P**?

If you can answer yes to all six, you are well prepared for Paper 1.